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Research Note: The Emerging Socio-Economic Cleavage 
of Mississippi Republicanism 
RAYMOND TATALOVICH 
Chicago State University 
The growth ofRepublicanism in the "Solid" South is a political development which 
promises major implications for the region and the nation. An authority on this subject, 
Donald S. Strong , has argued that the growing popularity of the GOP in the South 
represents a conservative reaction to the economic, rather than racial , policies of the 
national Democratic Party. 1 To support his thesis , Strong shows that Republicans 
tended to draw from the same counties in the Presidential elections ofl952, 1956, and 
1960. In addition , his factor analysis of the 1968 Presidential election indicates that a 
"high-status-urban" factor showed the most consistent pro- ixon relationship in all 
eleven states of the former Confederacy. 
His thesis is extremely persuasive, but the nature of Southern Republicanism may 
be more precisely defined if extensive analysis is undertaken in one state. This research 
will evaluate Strong's argument in terms of the electoral cleavage supportive of GOP 
voting in 1ississippi. Even today , Mississippi's internal politics remain in the hands of 
Democrats , and Republican grass roots organizational efforts have begun only since 
the 1960's. 2 In this light , Republican prospects in Presidential elections are probably 
shaped largely by national political forces rather than by any partisan realignment 
within the state 's electorate. 3 
Strong 's thesis will be studied from two perspectives. First , the votes cast for 
Republican Presidential candidates from 1952 to 1972 will be correlated to those cast 
for ultra-conservatives who openly championed the cause of racial separatism. They 
were Strom Thurmond in 1948, unpledged electors in 1956 and 1960, and George 
Wallace in 1968. If racial motivations were not salient to GOP voting , it is hypothesized 
that the Republicans should draw from counties which did not support those racists. 
Second , the socio-economic composition of the counties voting for Barry Goldwa-
ter, George Wallace, Richard ixon, and Gerald Ford will be determined. Also, those 
Republican candidates in Senatorial (1972) and Gubernatorial (1967 and 1975) elec-
tions will be studied in terms of similar socio-economic variab les to detem1ine the 
consistency of GOP voting patterns. If economic motivations are primary to Republi-
can voting , it is hypothesized that Republicans tend to draw from counties of upper 
socio-economic status. In contrast , George Wallace shou ld draw disproportionate 
votes from counties of lower SES composition. Simple and partial correlations are 
used, so the "ecological fallacy" applies. 4 While the count ies may be characterized by 
1 Donald S. Strong , "'Further Reflections on Southern Politics," The journal of Politics, 33 (May, 1971), 
239-256. Also see his Urban Republicanism in the South (University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administra-
tion, University of Alabama, 1960); "'Durable Republicanism in the South ," in Allan P. Sindler , ed ., Change in 
the Contemporary South (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963). 
2 See the discussion of Republican emergence in Mississippi in the following: Charles . Fortenberry and 
F. Glenn Abney, "Mississippi: Unreconstructed and Unredeemed ,"" in The Changing Politics of the South, ed . 
William C. Havard (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972). 
3 By the late 1960"s one study indicated movement of Democrats to an Independent stance, but it found no 
wholesale defection by Mississippians to the Republican identification. See F . Glenn Abney , "Partisan 
Realignment in a One-Party System : The Case of Mississippi," The journal of Politics, 31 (November , 1969), 
1102-1106. 
4 See W . S. Robinson, "Eco logical Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological 
Review , 15 Qune , 19.50), 351-357. 
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socio-economic variables, inferences about individual voting behavior cannot be ex-
trapolated from such data . 
A matrix of correlations for ten Presid ential candidates is provided in Tabl e 1. As 
indicated, the same Mississippi counties tended to support Thurmond , the 1956 and 
1960 unpl edged e lec tors , and Goldwat er. The elec tions of Eisenhower in 1956 and of 
Nixon in 1960 and 1968 were not statistically relat ed to the first grouping. To this 
extent, th e first hypothesis is confirmed. The e lec tions of Eis enhower in 1952, of 
Goldwater , of Wallace, and of Nixon in 1972 need further clarification, however. 
It would seem that Ike 's first election was transitional. It correlates to the elections 
of Strom Thurmond in 1948 and of unpl eclged elec tors in 1956, but it is also re lated to 
Eisenhower's re-e lec tion and to Nixon's 1960 campaign. In 1952 th e Mississippi 
electorate was den ied an ultra-conservative alternative to th e major parties , but the 
voters may have harbor ed an anti-Democratic sentiment from the 1948 Dixicrat revolt. 
In this light , eve n though his views on race were not well known , Ike's candidacy may 
have seemed preferable to many Mississippians than that of Adlai E. Stevenson. 
Goldwater's elec tion does not correlate significantly to any election by a Rep ubli-
can during th e period. As not ed also by Donald S. Strong , and affirmed by the data 
her e, Barry Goldwater was not typi cal of Republicans in his e lec toral appeal. Though 
not a racist , Goldwater campaigned at a tim e when his conservatism may have been 
linked to the racial issue by Mississippians. His elec tion can1e two years after the "Ole 
Miss" incident and one year after a gubernatorial campaign dominated by seg-
regationist rh e toric . 
Wallace's e lec tion is strongly correlated to Nixon's 1972 campaign. This datum 
suggests that Nixon's re -elec tion may not confirm Strong's thesis. Given th e "ra dical" 
image surrounding the candidacy of George McGovern , many Mississippians may 
have voted Rep ublican for reaso ns other than eco nomic self int erest. But the e lec tions 
ofWallace in 1968 and of Nixon in 1972 are unrelated statistically toed/ their predeces-
sors. Such departur e in the histori cal pattern is especi ally curious for Wallace , whose 
racial views appeared so compatible with thos e ultra-conservatives who preceded him. 
This discontinuity may be explained by the changing nature of the Mississippi e lec to-
rate. By 1968 su bstantial numbers of Blacks were registered to vote. 5 And ev idence 
shows that white hostility to civil rights has been greatest in thos e areas of the South 
populated by hug e concentrations of Blacks . 6 If it may be assumed that such coun ties 
gave disproportionate support for rightists in 1948, 1956, 1960, and 1964, th e entrance 
ofBlacks into the elec torat e by 1968 would have the effect of diluting Wallace's support 
in those areas. The same distortion in the statewide distribution of white votes would 
apply to Nixon's 1972 election. This speculation , obviously , presumes that Blacks did 
not vote for ei ther Wallace or Nixon in extraordinary numbers . 
At this juncture , it should be noted that Rep ublicans drew extraordinar y suppo rt in 
1952, 1964, and 1972, but they did poorly in 1956, 1960, and 1968. 7 In th e first three 
e lec tions , only Rep ublican and Democra tic alternatives were given to the elec torate. 
In the second thr ee campaigns, however , ultra-conservatives stood to the right of both 
parties. ln 1956, 1960, and 1968, therefore, Mississippians were able to sort th em-
selves out ideologically to a greater extent. For that reason, the linkag e between these 
elec tions is espec ially pronounced. 
• The percent of voting age Blacks registered to vote in Mississippi jumped from 6. 7% in November , 1964 
to 32.9% in October of 1966. See Congl'essional Quarterly , Revolution in Civil Rights (Washington : Congres-
silinal Quarterly , Inc., 1965). p. 74. 
• This was the major conclusion by Donald R. Matthews and James W . Prothro in their major study, 
Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World , 1966). 
7 The percen\ of the vote obtained by Repu blicans in these years follows: 1952 - 39.6%, 1956 - 24.5%, 
1960 -24.7%. 1964 -87.1%, 1968 - 13.5%, 1972 - 78.2%. 
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The ecological data to be analysed here was drawn from the 1970 Census , the year 
nearest to the contemporary elections under study. The variables used are as follows. 
l. percent of families above the poverty line 
2. median age 
3. median family income 
4. percent nonwhite 
5. percent completing high school 
6. percent employed in manufacturing 
7. percent employed in white collar occupations 
8. percent urban 
9. percent rural 
10. percent born outside Mississippi 
In all elections studied, the percent nonwhite is controlled for in the partials derived. 
As shown in Table 2, the correlations are not statistically significant in every instance , 
but most tend in the expected direction. 
Republican candidate for President in 1968 and 1976, for Senator in 1972, and for 
Governor in 1967 and 1975 consistently relied on a socio-economic cleavage markedly 
different from that supportive of Wallace and Goldwater voting. All five Republicans 
tended to draw votes from counties typified by high school graduates, urban dwellers , 
and higher income families. Also, such counties were characterized by white collar 
rather than manufacturing employment. All these variables are positively inter-related 
at significant levels , so it appears that Republicanism does thrive in a milieu upper SES 
in charac ter. The upper socio-economic cleavage supportive of all five Republicans is 
confirmed even when the variable nonwhite is held constant. These findings also verify 
Strong's argument, and the hypothesis offered. 
On the other hand, voting for Wallace and Goldwater increased with the percent of 
counties' population in rural areas and in manufacturing employment. Both men also 
tended to rely on counties populated by few people of non-Mississippi origins. Gold-
water tended to do poorly in counties with a degree of affluence, as indexed by the 
percent of families above poverty and by the median family income. And though 
statistically insignificant, both tendencies are sustained by the partials derived. On 
these same indices of income , Wallace 's simple correlations do indicate an upper SES 
bias, but they are reduced to insignificant levels by the partial correlations. Overall, 
ther efore, both Wallace and Goldwater did not rely so exclusively on an upper SES 
cleavage, as did GOP candidates for President in 1968 and 1976, for Senator in 1972, 
and for Governor in 1967 and 1975. Counties populated by poorer Whites would 
exhibit more hostility to Black demands than would counties dominated by upward 
mobile, middle class Whites . Also, racism probably would not have helped ixon's 
campaign against George Wallace in 1968. 
ixon's 1972 election also was not so clearly linked to an upper socio-economic 
cleavage. The simple correlations do show significance on many upper SES variables, 
but that electoral cleavage is undermined when percent nonwhite is held constant. In 
conh·ast, most upper SES simple correlations are sustained by the partials in the 
elections of Nixon in ·1968, of Ford in 1976, and of Republican Senatorial (1972) and 
Gubernatorial (1967 / 1975) candidates. 
In 1972, only two partial correlations had statistical significance for Nixon's elec-
tion . That is, the control for nonwhite did not undermined the tendencies for Nixon to 
draw disproportionate votes in counties inhabited by rural dwellers and by 
Mississippi-born citizens. Other partial correlations are extremely weak, and three 
even show lower socio-economic tendencies. It appears, therefore, that the racial 
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variable had substantial impact on ixon's 1972 vote distribution in Mississippi but 
that purely socio-economic indicators did not. This data adds credence to the argument 
that Mississippians were reacting against George McGovern's candidacy when they 
voted Republican for President in 1972. Certainly his appeal to minorities , his advo-
cacy of welfare programs , and his opposition to Vietnam would hardly endear 
McGovern to the mass ofM ississippi's electorate. In this light , it is more comprehensi-
ble that Nixon's great popularity did not extend to the GOP Senatorial contender in 
1972, Gil Carmichael. Carmichael's electoral support was more limited to counties of 
upper socio-economic status. 
To summarize, the data for Mississippi confirm two hypothes es which relate 
Republican gains in the South to economic rather than racial factors. In terms of 
historical antecedents, GOP Presidential candidates in 1956, 1960, and 1968 exemplify 
modern Republicanism. They are not linked to those racial separatists who cam-
paigned in 1948, 1956, and 1960. In terms of electoral cleavage , Nixon in 1968 and 
Ford in 1976 relied on counties of upper SES attributes; similar SES variables 
correlated to th e campaigns of Republican Senatorial (1972) and Gubernatorial (1967 
and 1975) candidates. But when Republican Presidential contenders obtained extraor-
dinary voter support in Mississippi , their upper socio-economic cleavage was either 
weakened ( ixon in 1972) or undermined entirely (Goldwat er in 1964). In these 
instances, the marked shift to the GOP may be related to the "status" anxieties of the 
White mass who live amongst huge concentrations of Blacks rather than to the 
economic "class" interests of the middle class White community. 
TABLE l. Matrix Showing Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Voting By Mississippi Counties 
in Ten Presidential Elections. 
-g ~ ~ -ti -ti .: ~ " .. 0 C .. ;; .; 
..c ..c 1; "C ~ E 
.h .. • i~ = a:, ~ Cl ~ :s g-~ §-§ ~~ ~~ o~ ~ a; ~"' i~ w~ ·- a, F - l.u - ::::,_ z- ;;, - () -
Thurmond , 
1948 X .433 -. 023* .585 .014* .587 .728 -.26 1 -.445 -.43 1 
Eisenhower , 
1952 X .616 .677 .496 . 126* .162* .353 -.59 1 -.494 
Eisenhower, 
19.56 X -.008* .465 -.394 -.327 .602 -.22 0 -. 006* 
Unpledged. 
1956 X .133* .553 .611 -. 100* -.6 72 - .632 
Nixon, 
1960 X -.333 -.126* .548 -.267 -.059"' 
Unpledged, 
1960 X .795 -.580 -.092* - .352 
Goldwater , 
1964 X -.508 -. 133* -.276 
Nixon, 
1968 X -.371 .110* 
Wallace, 
1968 X .840 
Nixon , 
1972 X 
• fnd1catt.•,; :-.tatisti<·al insiJO"tific.:ance. All other,; are significant at least at the .05 level. 
TABLE 2. Simple and Partial (Control Non White) Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Ten Socio-Economic Variables and Votes for Republican 
Presidential , Senatorial and Gubernatorial Candidates and for George Wallace in Mississippi Counties* 
President President President President Sena.tor Governor Governor Wallace 
1964 1968 1972 1976 1972 1967 1975 1968 
above -.437 .435 .667 .508 .218 -. 005 .446 .710 >-l 
poverty (-:,094) ( .481) (-.0 10) ( .492) ( .120) ( .419) ( .633) ( .112) ::r: 
t'l 
median -.203 -.226 .735 .167 .239 -. 144 -. 099 .987 t'l 
age ( .584) (-.93 6) (-. 133) (-. 028) ( .285) ( .426) (-.2 09) ( .909) ~ 
median -.366 .486 .511 .541 .261 .262 .534 .456 :ii 0 
income (-. 144) ( .468) ( 072) ( .489) ( .231) ( .573) ( .624) ( .007) z 
non- .496 -. 177 -.862 -.28 0 -. 126 .367 -. 083 -.8 66 0 
white ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 00 0 
(") 
high -.2 19 .586 .382 .666 .323 .245 .711 .264 .... 0 
school ( .026) ( .581) (-. 077) ( .632) ( .303) ( .461) ( .775) (-. 349) M 
manufa c- -. 181 -.349 .466 -. 170 .018 -.4 57 -.3 59 .590 
(") 
0 
turing ( .118) (-.535) ( .005) (-.395) (-. 057) (-.33 6) (- .480) ( .294) z 0 
white -. 195 .693 -. 000 .485 .295 .479 .751 -.236 :s: .... 
collar (-.1 77) ( .691) (-. 143) ( .479) ( .288) ( .556) ( .749) (-. 621) (") 
(") 
urban -.266 .665 .023 .420 .190 .505 .730 -. 262 I:"" 
(-.258) ( .663) (-. 103) ( .404) ( .179) ( .586) ( .729) (-.8 50) (%1 > 
< 
rural .268 -. 698 -. 052 -.4 20 -. 292 -.4 05 -. 730 .273 > 
( .211) (-.688) ( .202) (-.4 04) (-.2 77) (-.514) (-. 729) ( .865) 0 t'l 
11011-Missis- -.468 .554 .198 .200 -. 029 .254 .310 -. 057 
sippi (-.351) ( .534) (-. 263) ( .106) (-. 081) ( .460) ( .302) (- .819) 
• Simple correlation coefficien ts are given first for each variable ; partial correlation coefficients are given in parentheses. In this table all simple and partial corr elations with a value of 
.200 or above are statistically significant at least at the .05 level. 
.... 
.... 
w 
